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Abstract
Avoidance of threatening or unpleasant events is usually an adaptive behavioural strategy. Sometimes, however, avoidance
can become chronic and lead to impaired daily functioning. Excessive threat-avoidance is a central diagnostic feature of
anxiety disorders, yet little is known about whether avoidance acquired in the absence of a direct history of conditioning
with a fearful event differs from directly learned avoidance. In the present study, we tested whether avoidance acquired
indirectly via verbal instructions and symbolic generalization result in similar levels of avoidance behaviour and threat-
beliefs to avoidance acquired after direct learning. Following fear conditioning in which one conditioned stimulus was
paired with shock (CS+) and another was not (CS2), participants either learned or were instructed to make a response that
cancelled impending shock. Three groups were then tested with a learned CS+ and CS2 (learned group), instructed CS+
(instructed group), and generalized CS+ (derived group) presentations. Results showed similar levels of avoidance behaviour
and threat-belief ratings about the likelihood of shock across each of the three pathways despite the different mechanisms
by which they were acquired. Findings have implications for understanding the aetiology of clinical avoidance in anxiety.
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Introduction
Avoidance of potentially threatening or unpleasant events is an
often-automatic feature of daily life. Sometimes, avoidance has
obvious survival advantages, for instance, in situations where
someone heeds a warning call and avoids the path of an oncoming
car. However, there may be countless other occasions where
avoidance is the default mechanism for coping with fearful events,
such as when a socially anxious individual avoids new social
situations because of the potentially aversive consequences that
may occur. The predominant use of avoidance as a means of
attenuating the effects of actual and anticipated fear can lead to
further social withdrawal. Moreover, by definition, engaging in
avoidance allows for few, if any, opportunities to disconfirm the
hypothesis that avoidance may actually be counterproductive. As a
result, avoidance can become chronic and debilitating and lead to
impaired social functioning and possible psychopathology.
Excessive avoidance is a central diagnostic feature and known
risk factor in the acquisition and maintenance of anxiety disorders
[1–4]. Clinical and anecdotal reports of anxiety often, but not
always, describe a prior experience of fear conditioning that
precipitates avoidance [5,6]. Fear conditioning involves pairing a
conditioned stimulus (CS; e.g., a light) with an unconditioned
stimulus (US; e.g., electric shock). After sufficient pairings,
presentations of the CS alone come to elicit conditioned fear
[7]. While it widely known that stronger fear conditioning may be
a factor in anxiety disorders [8], a growing body of evidence also
attests to the fact that direct contact with an aversive event may
not be necessary for fear conditioning to occur [9–12,6]. Indeed,
fear acquired through pathways other than Pavlovian condition-
ing, such as verbal instructions and social observation, is often
indistinguishable from directly learned fear that arises following
pairing of neutral and aversive stimuli [13–16]. Further analysis of
fear and avoidance acquired via indirect pathways may provide a
novel basis for understanding the aetiology of anxiety disorders
[5,17].
Regardless of how it is acquired, fear often leads to expectancies
and avoidance of fear provoking or threatening stimuli. Avoidance
occurs when a response, such as pressing a key, in the context of a
warning signal (e.g., a light) that precedes a US leads to omission
of the US. By virtue of Pavlovian conditioning, the warning signal
comes to function as a CS and elicits fear because of its prior
relationship with the US when the avoidance response is not
made. Avoidance is learned via operant negative reinforcement
when the probability of emitting the avoidance response in the
context of the warning signal increases [18]. While it is likely that
some avoidance behaviours are acquired following direct contact
with an aversive stimulus, many forms of chronic avoidance may
be acquired through indirect pathways [19]. Despite this,
surprisingly little research has been conducted on these alternative
pathways and whether they result in equivalent levels of
avoidance. Thus, an investigation into the relative levels of
avoidance in the presence of CSs acquired via indirect pathways,
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such as instruction, and following direct aversive Pavlovian
conditioning would be salutary.
Within associative learning, stimulus generalization may occur
whereby stimuli physically similar to the CS occasion responding
along a specified dimension. For instance, fear conditioning has
been shown to generalize along perceptual [9,20,21] and
conceptual/semantic continua [10,22]. Little is known, however,
about the generalization of avoidance along symbolic dimensions.
Whereas generalized avoidance of degraded coloured circles along
a physical continuum between CS+ and CS2 has been
demonstrated [23], other evidence suggests that symbolic generaliza-
tion of avoidance may also occur in which physically dissimilar
stimuli indirectly related to the CS occasion avoidance [24–30].
Symbolic generalization is underpinned by an extensive
literature on derived stimulus relations, such as stimulus equiva-
lence, which shows that when humans are taught a series of
relations involving dissimilar (arbitrary) stimuli, the stimuli
involved often become related to each other in ways not explicitly
trained [31,32]. For instance, if choosing Stimulus X in the
presence of Stimulus A is taught (i.e., A–X), and choosing Stimulus
Y in the presence of Stimulus A (i.e., A–Y) is also taught, it is likely
that untrained relations will emerge between X and A, Y and A, X
and Y, and Y and X, in the absence of any feedback. Moreover,
when one stimulus is also a CS for avoidance the remaining,
indirectly related stimuli may also come to occasion symbolic
generalization of avoidance in the absence of any further learning
[18]. For instance, Dymond and colleagues [27] first trained and
tested participants for the formation of stimulus equivalence
relations consisting entirely of abstract, arbitrary stimuli (AV1-
AV2-AV3-AV4 and N1-N2-N3-N4; note that AV refers to cues
from the class of avoidance stimuli, and N refers to neutral cues).
During the avoidance-learning phase, one stimulus (AV2) was
followed by aversive images and sounds unless a response was
made (pressing the space-bar once), and another (N2) was not.
When the avoidance response was performed, AV2 was removed
from the screen and the aversive stimuli omitted. The symbolic
generalization of this threat-avoidance responding was then tested
with presentations of stimuli that had not been present during the
avoidance-learning phase. All participants readily made the threat-
avoidance response to AV3 and AV4 (indirectly related to AV2)
and not to N3 and N4 (indirectly related to N2). Additionally,
measures of threat beliefs (subject’s expectancies of aversive images
following avoidance and non-avoidance) paralleled avoidance
behavior patterns, thereby providing the first evidence of symbolic
generalization of threat beliefs.
The findings of Dymond et al. showed that establishing
avoidance of one stimulus in a derived relational network also
produces avoidance of all indirectly related stimuli in the network,
via symbolic generalization. It remains to be seen, however,
whether avoidance rates and expectancies of an aversive stimulus
(i.e., threat beliefs) acquired via symbolic generalization are
comparable to those acquired via other pathways, such as
instructions, and to what extent they differ, if at all, from directly
learned avoidance.
According to propositional models of avoidance learning
[33,34], avoidance behaviour is driven by propositional beliefs
about when aversive events are likely to occur and how those
aversive events can be avoided. Importantly, propositions can be
formed not only on the basis of direct experience but also on the
basis of instructions or inferences. As such, propositional models
allow for avoidance behaviour that is based on instructions (via
propositions that result from instructions) and symbolic general-
ization (via propositions that are formed as the result of inferences).
To the extent that instructions and inferences contain the same
information as direct experience, all three routes should give rise to
identical propositions and would thus lead to similar threat-belief
ratings and avoidance responses. Note that from the perspective of
propositional models, symbolic generalization in avoidance
learning requires more inferential steps than the other pathways.
Participants not only need to form the proposition that a particular
stimulus (e.g., AV2) is followed by a US, but also that another
stimulus is equivalent to that CS (e.g., AV4) and will thus also be
followed by a US. Assuming that an error or uncertainty might
occur at each inferential step, symbolic generalization in
avoidance learning could turn out to be weaker that avoidance
learning via direct observation or instructions.
To test this, the present experiment employed a between-
participants design to investigate the acquisition and maintenance
of avoidance through learned, instructed, and derived pathways. We
hypothesized that the groups would not differ following fear
conditioning in that threat-belief ratings of the likelihood of shock
following a CS+ would always be greater relative to a CS-. After
avoidance learning, we expected all groups to make a greater
proportion of avoidance responses to a CS+ relative to a CS2,
give lower threat-belief ratings in the presence of the avoidance
response, and higher ratings in the absence of the avoidance
response, to the CS+ relative to the CS2. We predicted that this
trend would be maintained during extinction testing and that
levels of avoidance and threat beliefs occasioned by the Instructed
CS+ and Derived CS+ would not differ.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Ninety participants, 22 men and 68 women (M age = 25.06,
SD=10.05) were recruited from Swansea University and random-
ly assigned to one of three groups: Learned, Instructed, and
Derived. All participants provided written informed consent and
were compensated with either course credit or £5.
Ethics Statement
The Department of Psychology, Ethics Committee, Swansea
University approved the study. All participants provided signed,
informed consent.
Apparatus and Material
The experiment was conducted in a small room containing a
desktop PC and a 170 monitor with a 60 Hz refresh rate. Coloured
circles (red, blue, yellow, and green) served as CSs; two were used
for the Learned group, three for the Instructed group, and four for
the Derived group, respectively. Electric shocks delivered via a bar
electrode fitted to the participant’s non-dominant forearm were
controlled by a PowerLabH isolated stimulator (ADI Instruments,
Oxford, United Kingdom). At the outset, all groups underwent a
shock calibration procedure in which they selected a shock level
that was ‘‘uncomfortable, but not painful’’.
Procedure
All groups received the same four conditioning phases
(habituation, fear conditioning, avoidance learning, and extinction
test; see Fig. 1). Prior to the fear and avoidance phases, only
participants in the Derived group were exposed to a relational
learning phase involving nonsense words (A= ‘‘Zid’’, B = ‘‘Vek’’)
and coloured circles (counterbalanced across participants) as
stimuli. For this group, a matching-to-sample procedure was used
to train conditional discriminations (Zid-Blue, Zid-Green, Vek-
Yellow, Vek-Red) and test for the emergence of stimulus
equivalence relations (Blue-Green, Green-Blue, Yellow-Red,
Pathways of Threat-Avoidance
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Red-Yellow; see Fig. 1). On every training trial, a nonsense word
(Zid or Vek) first appeared in the top centre of the computer
screen (called the sample stimulus). Clicking on the sample
immediately produced two coloured circles (Blue and Yellow or
Green and Red) positioned below and to the left and right of the
screen (called the comparison stimuli). Participants selected one of
the comparisons by clicking on it with the computer mouse. When
Zid was presented, clicking on the Blue comparison stimulus
produced the feedback ‘‘Correct’’ in the centre of the screen, while
clicking on Yellow produced the feedback ‘‘Wrong’’. When Vek
was presented, clicking on the Yellow comparison stimulus
produced the feedback ‘‘Correct’’ in the centre of the screen,
while clicking on Blue produced the feedback ‘‘Wrong’’. When Zid
was presented, clicking on the Green comparison stimulus
produced the feedback, ‘‘Correct’’ in the centre of the screen,
while clicking on Red produced the feedback ‘‘Wrong’’. When
Vek was presented, clicking on the Red comparison stimulus
produced the feedback, ‘‘Correct’’ in the centre of the screen,
while clicking on Green produced the feedback ‘‘Wrong’’ (see
Fig. 1). Feedback was displayed in size 14 Arial black font within a
4.562 cm square in the middle of the screen for 2 s, and was
followed by an intertrial interval (ITI) of 2 s. All four tasks (Zid-
Blue, Zid-Green, Vek-Yellow, Vek-Red) were presented in a block
of 8 trials (each task presented twice) in a pseudorandom order,
with the constraint that the same task could not appear on more
than two consecutive trials. Correct selections were taught via
feedback until participants made eight consecutive correct
responses.
On meeting the training criterion, a block of 16 trials were
presented that tested for the emergence of combined symmetry
and transitivity (i.e., stimulus equivalence) relations. Each of the
four tasks (Blue-Green, Green-Blue, Yellow-Red, Red-Yellow) was
presented four times in the absence of feedback. When Blue was
presented, clicking on the Green comparison not Red, when Vek
was presented, clicking on the Yellow comparison not Blue, when
Zid was presented, clicking on the Blue comparison not Yellow,
and when Vek was presented, clicking on the comparison Red not
Green, was predicted (Fig. 1). The mastery criterion was 16
consecutive correct responses; if necessary, participants were re-
exposed to training and testing until the criterion was met. For the
Derived group, relational training and testing created stimulus
relations consisting of coloured circles to be used in the subsequent
phases.
In the habituation phase, participants were told that on each trial
one of two coloured circles would appear and that they should
simply watch the screen. The CS+ and CS2 were each presented
3 times for 3 s in the absence of shock. Order of presentation was
quasi-randomized with the constraint that no more than two
consecutive trials of either type could occur. In the fear conditioning
phase, participants were informed that on every trial they would
be presented with one of two coloured circles and that each circle
would appear for 3 s followed by either a 250 ms shock or no
shock. Participants were told the shock was set at the level they had
selected and that they would be asked to make some ratings about
the likelihood of shock following each of the coloured circles. Each
CS appeared 6 times in the centre of the screen for 3 s and shock
was presented following offset of the CS+. Shock never followed
any CS2 presentations. A 6 s ITI always occurred. After the 12th
trial, participants rated the likelihood of shock following the CS+
and CS2 using a 6-point scale (where 0 = not at all and 6= very
likely).
Next, in the avoidance learning phase, the Learned and Derived
groups were informed that when coloured circles appeared on
screen the marked keys on the keyboard would be available and
that pressing one of the keys (participants were not told which) in
the presence of one coloured circle would cancel upcoming shock.
They were also told that the key that cancelled shocks was the
same on all trials (this was counterbalanced across participants).
The Instructed group was also informed that when the Instructed
CS+, which was a coloured circle not presented during fear
conditioning, appeared they should press the specified marked key
on the right to avoid upcoming shock. For the Learned and
Derived groups, blocks of 12 trials, 6 of each CS, were presented
and participants had to meet the criterion of a minimum of 5 out
of 6 CS+ trials with the avoidance response to complete this phase.
Only one key could be pressed on each trial; when the correct key
was pressed, the CS+ was removed from the screen and the ITI
initiated, and when the incorrect key was pressed shock always
followed CS+ but not CS2 trials. Pressing the correct key had no
scheduled effects in the presence of the CS2 (i.e., it remained on
screen). No criterion was applied to the CS2, and the 12-trial
block was repeated until criterion was met.
For the Instructed group, blocks of 18 trials were presented (i.e.,
CS+, CS2 and Instructed CS+ each presented 6 times in a quasi-
random order) and participants had to meet the criterion of a
minimum of 5 out of 6 CS+ trials with the avoidance response
within a 18-trial block, which was repeated until criterion was met.
Although no formal criterion was applied to the Instructed CS+,
when the correct key was pressed in the presence of the Instructed
CS+, the stimulus was removed from the screen and the ITI was
initiated. Pressing the incorrect key in the presence of the
Instructed CS+ was, however, followed by shock. Because of the
possibility that participants may directly experience shock after the
Instructed CS+ when pressing the incorrect key, only those
participants who made the avoidance response on all Instructed
CS+ presentations were included in the analysis. After the final
trial, threat-belief ratings were made of the likelihood of shock
following the CS+, CS2 and, where relevant, Instructed CS+ and
Derived CS+, when the avoidance response was and was not
assumed to have been performed.
The final phase was the extinction test (i.e., no shocks were
presented), which began immediately following avoidance learn-
ing. For all groups, the CS+ and CS2 were each presented 6
times. The Instructed group also received 6 presentations of the
Instructed CS+, while the Derived group received 6 trials of the
Derived CS+, respectively (Fig. 1). Once again, participants rated
the likelihood of shock following the CS+ and CS2, and, where
relevant, the Instructed CS+ and Derived CS+, in the assumed
presence and absence of avoidance, respectively.
Data Analysis
During fear conditioning, mean ratings of the likelihood of
shock following the CS+ and CS2 were measured, while during
the avoidance learning and extinction test phases the total mean
number of trials in which the avoidance response was and was not
performed, the number of cycles of trial blocks taken to meet
criterion, and mean ratings of the likelihood of shock following the
CS+, CS2, Instructed CS+ and Derived CS+, with and without
the avoidance response, were recorded. For the Derived group
only, additional dependent measures were the mean number of
trials to reach training criterion and the mean number of stimulus
equivalence test exposures. Multivariate F values, Pillai’s trace, are
reported for all main effects and interactions, with stimulus and
pathway as factors. Analyses were performed for avoidance
behavior and ratings with and without avoidance. Finally, paired
sample t-tests were conducted within groups to assess differences
between the Direct CS+ and each pathway. For all tests, level of
significance was set at.05.
Pathways of Threat-Avoidance
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Results
Participants in the Derived group required a mean of 73.5
(SD=63.7) training trials to reach criterion and a mean of 1.63
(SD=1.1) exposures to pass the equivalence test.
Analysis of threat belief ratings provided the index of fear
conditioning, and revealed a significant main effect of stimulus
(F(2,87) = 3149.02, p,.001), but no interaction between stimulus
and group (p= .692). As predicted, post-hoc t-tests showed that
CS+ and CS2 ratings differed significantly in the Learned,
t(29) = 20.796, p,.001, Instructed, t(29) = 13.88, p,.001, and
Derived, t(29) = 24.39, p,.001, groups, respectively. This shows
that each of the three pathways groups had formed a clear threat-
belief of shock following the CS+ but not following the CS2.
One participant in the Learned group and 3 from the Instructed
group failed to meet criterion in the avoidance learning phase and
were removed from further analysis. The final sample sizes were:
Direct (n = 29), Instructed (n = 27), and Derived (n = 30).
During avoidance learning (Fig. 2), we found a significant main
effect of stimulus [F(1,83) = 379.151, p,.001], which is consistent
with our hypotheses regarding a greater proportion of avoidance
responding to a threatening CS+ compared to a CS2, and no
interaction (p= .078). Subsequent paired sample t-tests confirmed
that there was a greater proportion of avoidance of the CS+ than
the CS2 by each group (all p’s ,0.001). The absence of a
significant interaction with group illustrates that avoidance
performed in the presence of the CS+ was comparable regardless
of the pathway. Subsequent post-hoc tests (corrected) revealed that
the proportion of avoidance responses evoked by the CS+ differed
between the Learned and Derived (p,.001) and Instructed and
Derived groups (p,.05).
In the analysis of threat-beliefs, we found a significant main
effect of stimulus when ratings questions asked participants to
assume they had [F(1,83) = 5.72, p,.05] or had not performed the
avoidance response [F(1,83) = 123.036, p,.001]. These findings
indicate that during avoidance learning all groups similarly
expected the presence or absence of shock depending on which
CS was present. There was a significant interaction between group
and stimulus when avoidance was assumed to be present
[F(1,83) = 3.590, p,.05] but not when absent (p = .713). Follow-up
tests showed no differences in in threat belief ratings made when
the avoidance response was assumed to be present (all p’s ..05).
With ratings made in the absence of avoidance, only the Learned
and Instructed groups differed in (p,.05).
Analysis of the proportion of avoidance responses evoked by
the CS+ and CS2 during the extinction test phase (Fig. 3)
Figure 1. Schematic overview of experimental design. All groups received habituation, fear conditioning, avoidance learning, and extinction
test phases. The Derived group only received the relational learning phase prior to habituation. Colours were counterbalanced across participants.
Hatched lines in avoidance learning and extinction test phases indicate additional stimuli presented to either the Instructed or Derived group. See
text for details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047539.g001
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showed there was a main effect of stimulus, F(1,83) = 307.729,
p,.001, indicating greater avoidance of the CS+ than CS2, but
no interaction with group (p = .115). Subsequent paired sample
t-tests confirmed a greater proportion of avoidance of the CS+
than the CS2 by each group (all p’s ,.001). Again, these
findings are consistent with our hypotheses concerning the
maintenance of avoidance acquired via learned, instructed and
derived pathways when tested under extinction. Follow-up
analyses revealed that only the Instructed and Derived groups
differed (p,.001) in the proportion of avoidance evoked by the
CS+. Moreover, there were no differences in avoidance evoked
by the directly learned CS+ and the Instructed CS+ (p = .302)
and the directly learned CS+ and the Derived CS+ (p= .158).
When threat-belief ratings were made when the avoidance
response was assumed to be present, we found no main effect of
stimulus (p = .810) and no interaction (p= .570). Figure 3 shows
that ratings were uniformly low in each of the three groups for all
stimuli presented. When ratings were made in the assumed
absence of avoidance, then a main effect [F(1,83) = 104.993,
p,.001] was found with higher ratings given to the CS+ than
CS2, but no significant interaction (p= .407). These findings
mirror those from avoidance learning (Fig. 2) and extend them to
situations involving ratings of the instructed and derived CSs. No
significant differences were found in follow-up analyses of threat
beliefs made when the avoidance response was assumed to be
either present or absent (all p’s .0.05). Finally, threat beliefs made
to the directly learned CS+ and the Instructed CS+ when the
avoidance response was assumed to be present (p= .713) and
absent (p = .456) did not differ, while threat beliefs made to the
Figure 2. Avoidance learning results. (A) Mean proportion of
avoidance in each of the groups. (B) Mean threat-beliefs with
avoidance. (C) Mean threat-beliefs without avoidance. Error bars reflect
standard error of the mean (SEM). * P,0.05, ** P,0.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047539.g002
Figure 3. Extinction test results. (A) Mean proportion of avoidance.
(B) Mean threat-beliefs with avoidance. (C) Mean threat-beliefs without
avoidance. Error bars reflect standard error of the mean (SEM). * P,0.05,
** P,0.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047539.g003
Pathways of Threat-Avoidance
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directly learned CS+ and the Derived CS+ also did not differ when
avoidance was present (p= .158), but did when it was assumed to
be absent, t(30) = 2.715, p,.05.
Discussion
Our findings demonstrate, for the first time, the acquisition and
maintenance of equivalent levels of avoidance behaviour acquired
via learned, instructed and symbolic generalization (derived)
pathways. In line with our predictions, avoidance behaviour of
the three groups did not differ following fear conditioning and
avoidance learning, and threat-belief ratings of the likelihood of
shock following the CS+ were always greater relative to the CS2.
Consistent with our predictions, these trends persisted during
extinction testing as all groups made a greater proportion of
avoidance responses to the CS+ relative to the CS2 and gave
lower threat-belief ratings in the presence of the avoidance
response and higher ratings in the absence of the avoidance
response to the CS+ compared to the CS2. Moreover, levels of
avoidance and threat beliefs occasioned by the Instructed CS+ and
Derived CS+ did not differ. Taken together, these findings show
that conditioned, instructed and derived pathways to threat-
avoidance and threat-beliefs in humans are equally efficacious
[14].
During avoidance learning, avoidance evoked by the directly
learned CS+, which all participants experienced from the outset,
differed between the Learned and Derived and Instructed and
Derived groups, respectively, with the latter difference also evident
in the subsequent test phase. The factors responsible must for the
present time remain speculative, but it is notable that the
Instructed CS+ occasioned more avoidance than the Derived
CS+, demonstrating the powerful effect that verbal instructions
exert over behaviour. By comparison, the relatively similar but
non-significantly different level of avoidance occasioned by the
Derived CS+ is consistent with our previous findings on human
symbolic generalization of avoidance [25–27]. It was also notable
that avoidance occasioned by the Learned CS+ and the Derived
CS+ was the only significant difference observed across the groups
during testing (Fig. 3), with avoidance of the directly learned CS+
in each of the instructed and derived groups being broadly similar.
The reduction in levels of avoidance occasioned by the Derived
CS+ has been widely observed [27] and is partly due to the fact
that testing is undertaken under conditions of extinction. While
participants avoided approximately 70% of all Derived CS+
presentations and presumably treated it as if it were equivalent to a
learned CS+, it is possible that having not encountered it since the
relational learning phase its presentation could have prompted
participants to initially withhold avoidance responding in order to
determine whether or not shocks would be delivered. However,
this possibility is unlikely because a re-examination of the raw data
revealed that only 30% of participants in the Derived group failed
to make the correct avoidance response from the very first
presentation of the Derived CS+. This suggests that for the
majority of participants in this group, presentation of a cue
indirectly related to a learned CS+ for avoidance was sufficient to
evoke generalized avoidance from the outset. Similarly, the
differences found between the directly learned CS+ and Derived
CS+ (Fig. 3) indicate that for the Derived group, threat-beliefs
were likely modulated by the combined influence of the novel
testing context and extinction conditions. It remains to be seen
whether extended extinction testing would serve to diminish
avoidance responding and beliefs still further. Future research on
the persistence of derived avoidance and test factors influencing
relative rates of instructed avoidance is clearly warranted.
During testing, the proportion of avoidance evoked by the CS+
only differed between the Instructed and Derived groups (a trend
that continued from acquisition), but, crucially, the Instructed CS+
and Derived CS+ did not differ from the Learned CS+. That is,
avoidance evoked by a cue that was directly learned about,
instructed, or indirectly related to a CS+ was indistinguishable and
occurred under conditions where no aversive events (shocks) were
scheduled. The present findings are the first demonstration of
equivalent levels of avoidance occasioned by each of three
different pathways and add to the existing literature on social
transmission of fear [14], the role of verbal instructions in human
learning [35,36] and processes of symbolic generalization as an
alternative pathway to fear and avoidance [18,27]. All groups had
matched histories of directly experiencing shock following the CS+
and went on to show avoidance of, and give elevated threat belief
ratings to, cues that acquired fear-provoking properties via verbal
instructions or participation in derived equivalence relations.
These results suggest that a direct history of both fear conditioning
and avoidance learning is not necessary in order to show
subsequent avoidance of potentially threatening stimuli. Interest-
ingly, these findings indicate that fear conditioning and avoidance
learning may be readily established on the basis of instructions
alone. Further research that addresses these and other possibilities
is warranted.
The present results are in line with the predictions of
propositional models of avoidance learning [33,34]. These models
postulate that avoidance is driven by propositional beliefs about
when aversive events are likely to occur and how they can be
avoided. In accounting for the present findings, propositional
models contend that during acquisition and testing the three
pathways gave rise to similar propositions that resulted in
equivalent levels of avoidance and modulation of threat beliefs.
Provided that in all conditions, the same propositions are formed
about the relations between CSs and the US and about the effect
of avoidance behaviour on the US, behaviour should be identical
in all conditions, irrespective of whether the propositions were
based on experience, instructions, or inferences. The fact that
avoidance responses were somewhat less frequent for the Derived
CS+ than for the Instructed CS+ could be related to the fact that
participants have to go through an additional inferential step in
order to conclude that avoidance is necessary with a Derived CS+
(i.e., the proposition that the Derived CS+ is equivalent to a CS+
that is actually followed by the US). However, based on this
reasoning, one would also have expected less avoidance for the
Derived CS+ than for the Learned CS+, which was not observed.
Hence, we refrain from making strong conclusions about whether
or why the derived pathway leads to weaker avoidance than other
pathways.
Our findings are also consistent with a modern functional
account insofar as such an account also assumes only one
underlying functional process common to all three learning
pathways. More specifically, all of the research published to date
on symbolically generalized fear and avoidance, assumes that a
process known as the transformation of stimulus functions [37] underlies
the generalization from CSs to those presented during critical test
phases. This process is assumed to be a fundamental learning
mechanism by which language comes to influence behaviour and
is readily observed for verbally able populations, but not for non-
verbal organisms [38]. Essentially, if at least two arbitrary stimuli,
A and B, participate in a derived relation, such as equivalence, and
A has a certain psychological function, like conditioned fear, then
the functions of B will be transformed in accordance with that
relation and also come to elicit fear, in the absence of further
training. Of course, the findings of the Derived group are readily
Pathways of Threat-Avoidance
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explained in these terms, but a similar theoretical analysis may be
applied to the findings of the Instructed group as well. According
to this view, verbal instructions such as ‘‘press the marked key to
avoid shock when you see the blue circle’’ establish derived
relations of equivalence between words (e.g., ‘‘blue circle’’) and
actual objects or events, while the words ‘‘press the marked key’’
alter the functions of the marked key such that the listener is likely
to press in those instances or contexts specified in the rule (i.e., in
the presence of the blue circle). To follow rules or instructions like
this, the listener requires the ability to derive relations between
words and objects and events, and it is in this way that the
transformation of stimulus functions may be said to underlie the
effects of instructions on avoidance behaviour. The transformation
of functions can even be applied to explain directly conditioned
fear or avoidance, insofar as the response functions of the US
transfer to the CS (i.e., the stimulus properties of the CS are
transformed by its contingent relationship to the US).
A functional, behaviour-analytic explanation of the current
effects based on the transformation of stimulus functions offers the
parsimony of a propositional account, whilst retaining its
traditional emphasis on the prediction and control of behaviour
without appeal to unobservable mental processes (i.e., it is
atheoretical) [39]. It is important to note, however, that the
functional and propositional accounts are not mutually exclusive
[40]. Whereas the functional notion ‘‘transformation of stimulus
functions’’ refers to the fact that stimulus functions can be
transformed as the result of a particular learning history,
propositional accounts focus on the mental processes by which
stimulus functions can be altered (i.e., the formation and truth
evaluation of propositions). Both types of accounts are thus
directed at different levels of explanation and are therefore not
mutually exclusive [40]. More generally, there is much to be
gained from greater co-operation between functionally oriented
and cognitively oriented researchers in explaining apparently
unconditioned fear and avoidance, and given the clear overlap in
research interests shared by these two traditions, such theoretical
collaborations are long overdue [40].
The present study has some potential limitations. First, during
extinction testing we could have presented a novel CS that was not
involved in the learning phase and that was neither an instructed
nor derived CS+. If participants always selected the avoidance
response and expected the US after a novel CS, then it might
suggest that effects observed were not due to instruction or
derivation. Second, another variant of the procedures applied to
the learned group might entail including a new CS in the
avoidance learning phase and/or extinction test. Moreover, the
derived group could also have been presented with a derived CS2
to test whether non-avoidance is similarly shown to generalize like
avoidance of a (derived) CS+. Third, future research should seek to
examine whether the present findings are replicated when both the
learned and derived groups are given filler training corresponding
to the number of trials, rate of reinforcement and length of time
taken by the derived group to complete the relational learning
phase (e.g., with a yoked control procedure [41]). Finally, online
shock expectancy ratings could have been measured on a trial-by-
trial basis to chart the formation of propositional knowledge
concerning the likelihood of shock modulated by the presence and
absence of avoidance. Nevertheless, the present findings indicate,
with a combination of within- and between-group comparisons,
that the three pathways did result in clear and unambiguous levels
of avoidance and threat-beliefs.
The present paradigm may be useful in the neuroimaging of
avoidance. For instance, functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) studies on the neural mechanisms of avoidance have
focused exclusively on the directly learned pathway and identified
a frontal-striatal-limbic network [42–44], with decreased activa-
tion in medial frontal and amygdala regions modulated by trait
levels of experiential avoidance [45]. With regards to the present
findings, it is likely that learned, instructed and derived pathways
of threat-avoidance differentially recruit a frontal-striatal-limbic
network. Although the expression of generalized fear involves the
striatum, insula, thalamus/periacqueductal gray, and subgenual
cingulate cortex [46], more research is needed on the neural
mechanisms involved in the symbolic generalization of threat-
avoidance and any potential overlap with fear generalization
neurocircuity.
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